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ABSTRACT
Although highly automated vehicles (“HAVs”) have potential to reduce
deaths and injuries from traffic crashes, product liability litigation for
design defects in vehicles incorporating autonomous technology is
inevitable. During the early stages of implementation, courts and juries
will be forced to grapple with the application of traditional product
liability principles to a never before experienced category of highly
technical products. Recent decisions limiting the use of the consumer
expectations test in cases involving complex products prompted the
authors to examine more closely the history behind and the future
viability of the consumer expectations test in HAV litigation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, more than 35,000 individuals died in vehicle crashes in the U.S.
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)
estimated that 94% of these deaths were attributable to human error.1 In 2017
and 2018, in their own self-driving safety reports, General Motors and
Waymo also noted that approximately 1.2 million lives are lost worldwide
each year due to car crashes. 2 Each of these entities further agree that highly
automated vehicle (“HAV”) 3 technology has the potential to reduce or
1. Automated Vehicles for Safety, NHTSA, https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-inn
ovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last visited May 2, 2019).
2. WAYMO, WAYMO SAFETY REPORT: ON THE ROAD TO FULLY SELF-DRIVING 3
(2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/sdc-prod/v1/safety-report/Safety%20Report%20
2018.pdf; GENERAL MOTORS, 2018 SELF-DRIVING SAFETY REPORT 3 (2018), https://ww
w.gm.com/content/dam/company/docs/us/en/gmcom/gmsafetyreport.pdf.
3. For purposes of this paper, the terms highly automated vehicle (HAV) or “selfdriving” will refer to vehicles defined by SAE Levels 4–5. See SAE INTERNATIONAL,
TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES J3016 (2018), https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/j3016
_201806. The SAE levels of automation are as follows: (0) No automation; the vehicle
has zero autonomy, and the driver performs all tasks; (1) Driver Assistance: the vehicle
is controlled by the driver, but some driver assistance features are included; (2) Partial
Driving Automation: the vehicle has combined automated functions, but the driver must
remain engaged with the driving task and monitor the environment constantly; (3)
Conditional Driving Automation: the driver is necessary, but is not required to constantly
monitor the environment—the driver must be ready to take control of the vehicle at all
times; (4) High Driving Automation: the vehicle is capable of performing all driving
functions under certain conditions, but the driver has the option of controlling the
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remove human error from the equation. 4 Additional potential benefits
include reduced traffic congestion; increased mobility options for currently
underserved populations; and, increased comfort and a reduction in lost time
during vehicle operation. 5 Put simply, the stage is set for HAV technology
to revolutionize the mobile world.
During the implementation of HAVs, most sources agree that, due to their
highly complex and technical nature, consumer education about the products
will be key to successful and effective implementation. For its part, in the
2017 update, Automated Driving Systems 2.0, NHTSA stated that
“[E]ducation and training is imperative for increased safety during the
deployment of [HAVs],” and encourages the development of “consumer
education and training programs to address the anticipated differences in the
use and operation of [automated driving systems] from those of the
conventional vehicles that the public owns and operates.” 6 General Motors
and Waymo echoed these sentiments in their respective self-driving safety
reports with Waymo, in October 2017, even helping to launch – Let’s Talk
Self-Driving - which it describes as “the world’s first public education
campaign about fully self-driving vehicles.” 7 Taking this one-step further, in
2018, Ford provided its Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment Report – A Matter
of Trust. 8 In it, Ford makes clear “that the central challenge in the
development of self-driving vehicles” is not the technology, but, instead, it
is consumer trust in the “safety, reliability and experience that the technology
will enable.” 9 Ford reiterates this point stating about consumer education and
training that, “[B]ringing self-driving vehicles to market will require a
thoughtful and sustained effort to teach customers how they work, why
they’re safe and how to use them.” 10
In light of this, questions remain, particularly with respect to liability, if,
and when, an injury or death occurs in an HAV. The question of who is liable
when a self-driving vehicle crashes has generated significant debate and
vehicle; and (5) Full Driving Automation: the vehicle is capable of performing all driving
functions under all conditions, with the driver having the option of controlling the
vehicle.
4. See WAYMO, supra note 2; GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2.
5. GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2.
6. NHTSA, AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS: A VISION FOR SAFETY 2.0 15 (2017),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/vehicle-manufacturers/automated-driving-systems#automateddriving-systems-av-20.
7. WAYMO, supra note 2 at 30; GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2, at 32.
8. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A MATTER OF TRUST: FORD’S APPROACH TO
DEVELOPING SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES, https://media.ford.com/content/dam/fordmedia/p
df/ Ford_AV_LLC_FINAL_HR_2.pdf.
9. Id.at 3.
10. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
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conversation. Per NHTSA, “these are among many important questions
beyond the technical considerations that policymakers are working to
address before automated vehicles are made available.”11 NHTSA also posits
that questions of liability pertaining to HAVs are something within the
purview of each state to manage. 12 In the wake of some interesting opinions
in 2017, this question, and others, prompted the authors to examine the
historical development of product defect theories and, in particular, whether
the consumer expectations test can reasonably be applied to determine
liability in cases involving complex products.
II.

ADOPTION OF DESIGN DEFECT TESTS IN THE WAKE OF SECTION
402A OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.

In 1965, the law of torts and the field of product liability were altered
dramatically by the adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. 13 Section 402A sought to impose strict liability on the
manufacturers or sellers of defective products, regardless of negligence, and
became perhaps the most cited section of any Restatement of Law in legal
jurisprudence. 14
A.

The Consumer Expectations Test

Section 402A provides that “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property . . . .” 15 To guide courts in determining whether
a product is unreasonably dangerous, the drafters of the Second Restatement
included the following comment: “The article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics.” 16 This comment provided support for the pure
consumer expectations test in product defect cases. In turn, this product
defect test was embraced by courts in the years following the release of the
Second Restatement. 17 Over time, courts across the country recognized that
11. Automated Vehicles for Safety, supra note 1.
12. NHTSA, supra note 6, at 24.
13. See generally George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10

CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2301 (1989).
14. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 n.1 (1992).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
16. Id. at cmt. i.
17. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co., Inc., 268 N.W. 2d 830 (Iowa
1978); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Estate of Pinkham v.
Cargill, Inc., 55 A.3d 1 (Me. 2012) (citing Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932,
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there were significant issues with the Second Restatement’s pure consumer
expectations approach to defective design.
For example, in the 1967 case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme
Court of Oregon was faced with application of the consumer expectations
test in the context of a design defect claim involving a motor vehicle.18 In
Heaton, the plaintiff’s vehicle struck a rock in the roadway. After the
accident, the rim of the wheel was found to have separated from the rest of
the wheel assembly. The court utilized the consumer expectations test to
determine design defect, stating:
In the type of case in which there is no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, available to prove exactly what sort of
manufacturing flaw existed, or exactly how the design was
deficient, the plaintiff may nonetheless be able to establish his right
to recover, by proving that the product did not perform in keeping
with the reasonable expectations of the user. When it is shown that
a product failed to meet the reasonable expectations of the user the
inference is that there was some sort of defect. 19
However, the court recognized that in Heaton, the jury could not possibly
state from their own experience what the expectations of the average
consumer would be. 20 After all, high-speed collisions with large rocks are
not so common that the average person would know from personal
experience how the wheel assembly would perform in such a situation. 21 As
such, “[t]he jury would therefore be unequipped, either by general
background or by facts supplied in the record, to decide whether this wheel
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected.” 22
Unfortunately, the Heaton court ultimately refused to acknowledge that the
consumer expectations test simply did not apply in this situation, but instead
seemed to suggest that expert testimony would be required to establish the
consumer expectations. 23 The paradox is obvious: if an expert is required to
tell the consumer what to expect, is that truly the expectation of an ordinary
consumer?
Fortunately, courts have begun to recognize that utilizing the consumer
expectations test in cases involving alleged design defects in technically
940 (Me. 1982)); Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2008).
18. See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
19. Id. at 471–72 (emphasis added).
20. See id. at 472–73.
21. Id. at 473.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 474.
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complex products is simply not workable. 24 However, there are courts that
have found the consumer expectations test applicable, even where the
requisite knowledge is not within the purview of lay jurors. 25
B.

Risk Utility Test

As a result, many courts began to apply the test commonly referred to as
risk-utility balancing. Under this test, to establish a prima facie case of design
defect, the plaintiff must show that on balance, the utility of the challenged
product design outweighs the risk of danger inherent in the design. 26
Traditionally, under risk-utility, courts consider a multitude of factors to
determine whether a defect exists, including the following factors identified
in an influential article by Dean John W. Wade in 1973:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product;
(2) the safety aspects of the product;
(3) the availability of safer substitute products;
(4) the possibility of elimination of dangerous characteristics of the
product without impairing its usefulness;
(5) the user’s ability to avoid danger by safe use of the product;
(6) the anticipated dangers inherent in the product due to general
knowledge or the existence of warnings; and
(7) the possibility of loss-spreading by the manufacturer through
price setting or insurance. 27
Further, “[t]he utility of the product must be evaluated from the point of view
of the public as a whole, because a finding of liability for defective design
could result in the removal of an entire product line from the market.” 28
In 1998, the element of a reasonable alternate design was written into the
new Restatement (Third) of Torts. 29 Under § 2 of the Third Restatement, a
product is:
“[D]efective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
24. See, e.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Camacho v. Honda Motor Corp., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246–48 (Colo. 1987)). See also 2
LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 11.03 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed.).
25. See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 451–52 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995). See also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25.
26. See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
27. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS.
L.J. 825 (1973).
28. See Thibault, 395 A.2d at 807.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., 1998).
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by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption
of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor,
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe. 30
As noted in 2009, the “reasonable alternative design” standard of the Third
Restatement ultimately came to embody the “risk-utility test” that is applied
in the majority of United States jurisdictions today. 31
Significant developments since 2009, some of which are discussed more
fully below, further exemplify the national trend towards applying riskutility in complex design defect cases and moving away from the consumer
expectations test in this context. Indeed, in 2017, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that, “when the ultimate issue of design defect calls for a careful
assessment of feasibility, practicality, risk, and benefit, the case should not
be resolved simply on the basis of ordinary consumer expectations.” 32
C.

Hybrid Test

Other jurisdictions utilize a dual-approach to design defect claims.
California, for example, utilizes the consumer expectations test when
consumers are capable of developing expectations about the characteristics
of a product from everyday use. 33 For more complex products, where the
characteristics are outside the knowledge of an everyday consumer, courts
apply the risk-benefit test. 34 Thus, the determinative issue in many cases in
California and similar jurisdictions is whether a product is too complex or
unfamiliar for average consumers to develop expectations, such that
utilization of the consumer expectations test is improper. 35 Making this
determination in the context of autonomous technology should not be an
issue.
30. Id. The Third Restatement explicitly rejects consumer expectations as an
independent standard for determining design defect. See id. at §2 cmt. g.
31. See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1065
(2009). Notably, even courts that continue to utilize the consumer expectations test
exclusively often acknowledge that evidence of an alternative design is the most
appropriate and useful means of showing that a product is unreasonably dangerous. See,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 655 (Nev. 2017).
32. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 683 Fed. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1994)) (emphasis
supplied in original).
33. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 310–311.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 160–61
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
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This hybrid approach combines elements of both the consumer
expectations test and the risk-utility test. One example is the “either-or”
concept, which posits that:
[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in
light of the relevant factors . . . the benefits of the challenged design
do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. 36
This approach allows courts more flexibility in applying the appropriate test
based upon all of the relevant circumstances. For example, in Barker v. Lull
Engineering, the plaintiff sustained injuries while operating a loader at a
construction site and alleged that his injuries were caused by a defective
design of the product because it was not equipped with a roll bar or seat
belts. 37 The California Supreme Court rejected a pure consumer expectations
test and a pure risk-utility test, instead articulating the two-prong test
allowing a plaintiff to establish a design defect through either test.38 In so
holding, the court noted the benefits of the more flexible approach stating:
[I]t subjects a manufacturer to liability whenever there is something
“wrong” with a product’s design – either because the product fails
to meet ordinary consumer expectations as to safety or because, on
balance, the design is not as safe as it should be – while stopping
short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which
may result from the use of its product. This test, moreover,
explicitly focuses on the trier of fact’s attention to the adequacy of
the product itself, rather than on the manufacturer’s conduct, and
places the burden on the manufacturer, rather than the plaintiff, to
establish that because of the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit
in, the design process, an injury-producing product should
nevertheless not be found defective. 39
Other courts have taken a different approach in formulating a hybrid
consumer expectations and risk-utility test, incorporating risk-utility factors
into the consumer expectation analysis, and vice versa. 40 For example, in
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., the plaintiffs alleged that pneumatic
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

1997).

Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 455–56.
Id. at 456.
See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333–34 (Conn.
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hand tools manufactured by the defendant were defective in design because
they exposed the plaintiffs to excessive vibration, resulting in injuries to the
plaintiffs. 41 Although Connecticut courts had long applied the Second
Restatement’s consumer expectations test, the court recognized that “there
may be instances involving complex product designs in which an ordinary
consumer may not be able to form expectations of safety.” 42 In recognizing
this issue with the pure consumer expectations test, the Connecticut Supreme
Court adopted a “modified consumer expectation test, provid[ing] the jury
with the product’s risks and utility and then inquir[ing] whether a reasonable
consumer would consider the product unreasonably dangerous.” 43 In
determining a consumer’s reasonable expectations, the jury should consider
various factors, including but not limited to the “relative cost of the product,
the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and
feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk.” 44 In sum, under this
approach, “the consumer expectation test would establish the product’s risks
and utility, and the inquiry would then be whether a reasonable consumer
would consider the product design unreasonably dangerous.” 45 The
Connecticut Supreme Court’s approach was based, in part, on early drafts of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts on Product Liability. 46
MORE AND MORE COURTS ARE RECOGNIZING THE LIMITATIONS
OF THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST IN COMPLEX DESIGN DEFECT
CASES.

III.

In March 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
examined the question of whether the consumer expectations test or riskutility balancing test should be applied to determine whether a design defect
existed in a product liability case involving vehicle roof deformation. 47 In
Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiffs claimed that the roof of their
vehicle was defectively designed because it deformed inward eight inches
into the passenger compartment during a multiple rollover event. The
plaintiffs alleged that a properly designed roof should have resulted in less
than three inches of deformation in the subject crash.
The Edwards plaintiffs sought to prove design defect by showing that the
roof did not perform as the average consumer would have expected. Ford
filed a motion contending that the jury should be instructed on the risk-utility
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 683 Fed. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2017).
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test alone. Ford’s motion was granted and plaintiffs appealed. The Ninth
Circuit held that the risk-utility test was the proper test to be applied,
specifically recognizing the “lack of consumer expectations regarding the
extent to which the [vehicle]’s roof would crush in a multiple rollover
accident.” 48 The Ninth Circuit went on to note that “[d]rivers’ everyday
experiences do not allow for the formulation of reasonable expectations as
to the degree that a vehicle’s roof should crush during a rollover.” 49 The
Ninth Circuit did not feel it necessary to state whether or not this product
was too complex for the consumer expectations test to govern; instead, it was
enough to know that consumers simply would not have expectations related
to roof performance in a rollover. 50 Thus, the risk-utility test was the
appropriate test. 51
Another recent case decided by the Court of Appeal of California also
limited the applicability of the consumer expectations test. The plaintiff in
Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson contracted a rare condition known as SJS/TEN
as a reaction to taking over-the-counter ibuprofen produced by Johnson &
Johnson. Plaintiff sought to show that the drug was defectively designed
through utilization of the consumer expectations test.
The Court of Appeal found the consumer expectations had no place in
proving design defect under these facts, noting that “‘[t]he consumer
expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of
the product’s users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated
minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert
opinion about the merits of the design.’” 52 The plaintiff essentially attempted
to use consumer expectations to avoid having to confront the more difficult
risk-utility standard or any showing of a reasonable alternative design, but
also wished to introduce expert testimony to establish that the ibuprofen did
not meet consumer expectations. The court found this fact alone sufficient to
demonstrate the consumer expectations test was inappropriate for that case.53
Succinctly explaining the problem with applying consumer expectations
in the case of complex products or products with which consumers are
unfamiliar, the court stated: “[I]t could be said that any injury from the
intended or foreseeable use of a product is not expected by the ordinary
48. Id. at 611.
49. Id.
50. See id.; See also Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E. 2d 5, 13–14 (S.C. 2010)

(finding that the consumer expectations test was not appropriate in design defect case
after examining the issue in the context of an automotive rollover case involving an
allegedly defective seatbelt design).
51. See id.
52. Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
(quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
53. See id. at 168.
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consumer. If this were the end of the inquiry, the consumer expectations test
always would apply and every product would be found to have a design
defect.” 54
As to a non-complex product, the Tenth Circuit’s examination of
consumer expectations in Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc. is instructive. 55 Kokins
involved the determination of what design defect test should be used under
Colorado law in the context of a claim involving a metal marine cable, a
seemingly simple product. The court initially noted that, under Colorado law,
the risk-utility test and consumer expectations test are not mutually exclusive
of each other and can sometimes even be applied in the same case.56
However, the Tenth Circuit held that in the context of this particular product,
only the risk-utility test was proper, due to the technical and specific
information related to metallic corrosion. 57 Quite simply, in cases where
technical and scientific issues predominate, use of the consumer expectations
test, alone or in conjunction with the risk-utility test, is inappropriate.58
Finally, as recently as November, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court
determined that the “risk-benefit test is the appropriate test to assess whether
a product was unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect when . . . the
dangerousness of the design is ‘defined primarily by technical, scientific
information.’” 59 In Walker v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff proceeded to trial
against Ford for injuries sustained in a rear-end impact. 60 The plaintiff
alleged the seat in his vehicle was defectively designed, alleging theories
based in both strict liability and negligence. 61 At the end of trial, the trial
court instructed the jury that it could apply either a consumer expectation test
or risk-benefit test, and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff. 62 The court of
appeals reversed the jury verdict. 63
In affirming the Colorado Court of Appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized that it had “stated repeatedly that the risk-benefit test, not the
consumer expectation test, is the proper test to use in assessing whether a
product like the car seat . . . is unreasonably dangerous due to a design

See id. at 167 (emphasis added).
See Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2010).
See id. at 1297.
See id.
See id.
See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 406 P.3d 845, 850 (Colo. 2017) (quoting Ortho
Paharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986)).
60. See id. at 847–48.
61. See id. at 848.
62. See id. at 848.
63. See id. at 849.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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defect.” 64 The Court further noted:
[P]roducts-liability law has developed in part to “encourage
manufacturers to use information gleaned from testing, inspection
and data analysis” to help avoid product accidents. Using the riskbenefit test . . . helps further this objective, as it directs the factfinders to consider the manufacturer’s ability to minimize or
eliminate risks and the effect such an alteration would have on the
product’s utility, other safety aspects, or affordability. 65
While the authors recognize the debate about whether to apply the consumer
expectations test or the risk-utility test continues to this day, and that some
jurisdictions still apply the consumer expectations test, even in cases of
complex products, the above referenced opinions illustrate the issues and
concerns with asking jurors to determine the expectations of an ordinary
consumer when evaluating a highly technical products in design defect
matters.
IV.

THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE
TEST OF DESIGN DEFECT AS APPLIED TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGY

The arrival of any new product technology will bring with it litigation, and
along with that arguments for the legal standard that will place the lightest
burden on plaintiffs in this new arena. Thus, it is likely that as lawsuits begin
with autonomous vehicle technology, plaintiffs will argue that the consumer
expectations test should apply to their claims for alleged design defects in
autonomous vehicles. The argument will likely follow the reasoning
employed by courts that refuse to adopt the Third Restatement approach, or
that still strictly follow the consumer expectations test, i.e. that risk-utility
balancing, especially when a reasonable alternative design is required, places
too great of a burden on plaintiffs that do not have the resources to make
showings that are so technical in nature. 66
A.

Highly Automated Vehicles Are Too Complex for Consumer
Expectations to Govern.

The Society of Automotive Engineers lists six (6) levels of automation for

64. Id. at 850.
65. Id. at 851 (quoting Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo.

1987)).
66. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn.
1997); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001).
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HAVs. 67 Currently, all vehicles on roadways are levels one and two, with
Audi unveiling the world’s first production Level 3 vehicle in July 2017. 68
Further, even if fully autonomous vehicles were on the road today, the vast
majority of consumers will remain unfamiliar with the technology for the
foreseeable future. Drivers keep their vehicles on the road for over eleven
years on average, 69 so vehicles of lower automation levels will continue to
be the predominant means of automotive transportation for years to come. 70
Further, NHTSA acknowledges the lack of consumer experience with
autonomous vehicle technology, as well as how different these vehicles are
from conventional vehicles on the roads today. In 2017, in Automated
Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety, NHTSA pronounced that:
Proper education and training is imperative to ensure safe
deployment of automated vehicles. Therefore, manufacturers and
other entities should develop document, and maintain employee,
dealer, distributor, and consumer education and training programs
to address the anticipated differences in the use and operation of
HAVs [highly automated vehicles] from those of conventional
vehicles that the public owns and operates today. Such programs
should be designed to provide the target users the necessary level
of understanding to use these technologies properly, efficiently, and
in the safest manner possible. 71
Essentially, NHTSA is recommending a completely new dimension of
consumer education on how to use these products. Likewise, this education
will be aimed at and received primarily by consumers who actually purchase
and use autonomous vehicle technology and not automotive consumers
generally.
67. See SAE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3.
68. As reported in an article by IEEE Spectrum, Audi claims to have achieved level

3 through its “AI Traffic Jam Pilot” feature, which can only be activated when driving at
less than 37 mph. See Philip E. Ross, The Audi A8: The World’s First Production Car to
Achieve Level 3 Autonomy, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 11, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/ca
rs-that-think/transportation/self-driving/the-audi-a8-the-worlds-first-production-car-toachieve-level-3-autonomy.
69. Reno Charlton, American Drivers Keeping Cars on the Road for Longer:
Average Age Now 11.4 Years, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2013),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/american-drivers-keeping_b_3718301?guccounter=1.
70. See Brian A. Browne, Self-Driving Cars: On the Road to a New Regulatory Era,
8. J. L., TECH. & INTERNET 1, 3 (2017) (Giving examples of the various lower level
features many OEMs have planned for the coming years).
71. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL AUTOMATED
VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 24
(2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guida
nce%20PDF.pdf (emphasis added).
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On this point, in a 2014 survey conducted by researchers at the University
of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute, Americans were asked,
“[h]ow interested would you be in having a completely self-driving
vehicle . . . as the vehicle you own or lease?” The most commonly chosen
answer, comprising 33.7% of responses, was “not at all interested” with
another 22.4% of respondents answering that they would be only “slightly
interested.” 72 This information suggests that not only are most Americans
personally unfamiliar with HAVs, but that a majority of Americans will not
become familiar with such vehicles any time soon.
Another striking result of that survey was that, of Americans with Internet
access, only 70.9% of respondents had even heard of autonomous or selfdriving vehicles. 73 If these respondents were placed on a jury in a jurisdiction
applying the consumer expectations test, roughly three of twelve jurors
would be deciding liability based on the ordinary expectations of a consumer
for a product about which they had never heard.
Moreover, a study by various researchers in the MIT AgeLab suggests that
naming conventions for autonomous or “advanced driver assistance
systems” can influence the expectations that a consumer may have about
these systems. 74 In particular, the authors of this paper observed that:
[D]rivers’ attitudes and beliefs about system capability and
performance are known to influence their use of technology.
Factors such as a driver’s prior experience with similar
technologies, predisposed trusting tendencies, and attitudes formed
from exposure to media and societal opinion might all contribute to
a driver’s belief that a system can handle a task outside of its
[operational design domain]. 75
Further, the authors found that “the name of a driver assistance system also
has the potential to impact their perceptions of system capability.” 76 These
same perceptions or misconceptions developed by unfamiliar consumers
simply from the name of a particular system are sure to carry over to these
72. See BRANDON SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL SIVAK, PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT SELFDRIVING VEHICLES IN CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA 16 (Univ. of Mich.
Trans. Res. Inst. Report No. 2014-30, 2014), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/202
7.42/109433 (emphasis added).
73. See id. at 5.
74. Hillary Abraham, et al., What’s in a Name: Vehicle Technology Branding &
Consumer Expectations for Automation, AUTOMOTIVEUI ‘17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMOTIVE USER INTERFACES AND INTERACTIVE
VEHICULAR APPLICATION 226-234 (2017), available at http://st.sigchi.org/publications/
toc/auto-ui-2017.html.
75. Id.
76. Id.

LET’S BE REASONABLE

67

consumers ability to judge the systems if called upon in a legal setting.
This is important because, while the consumer expectation test is intended
to be an objective test that is applied based on the ordinary consumer’s
expectation, the gravamen of the test is that “the everyday experience of the
product’s users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated
minimum safety assumptions . . . .” 77 At least initially, and most likely for
quite a period thereafter, the average juror will simply not possess the
everyday experience necessary to properly assess the product in a consumer
expectations analysis. Rather, it is much more appropriate and fair to aid a
jury by allowing the greater body of evidence encompassed within a riskutility analysis.
B.

Consumer Expectations of Autonomous Vehicle Technology are
Inconsistent and Unrealistic at this Point.

Even when consumer expectations are drawn broadly (i.e., safe versus
unsafe), instead of in terms of how a particular aspect of an autonomous
vehicle should perform at a technical level, consumer expectations at this
point in time have not reached any kind of meaningful consistency. For
example, many consumers are highly skeptical of new HAV technology and
believe that the technology is inherently unsafe. 78 On the other hand, some
organizations anticipate large reductions in automotive accidents and
injuries as a result of this new technology and propound this message to the
general public. 79 For its part, NHTSA helped promote the narrative that the
promise of self-driving vehicles will lead to a marked increase in automotive
safety, noting in their 2017 update that, “in the transportation sector, where
9 out of 10 serious roadway crashes occur due to human behavior, automated
vehicle technologies possess the potential to save thousands of lives, as well
as reduce congestion, enhance mobility, and improve productivity.” 80 Some
manufacturers are no different: in GM’s 2018 Self-Driving Safety Report, the
manufacturer optimistically stated that as a result of self-driving technology,
they “envision a future with zero crashes.” 81
Further, HAV manufacturers, eager to explain the admittedly
revolutionary technology their vehicles employ, may inadvertently present
77. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 683 Fed. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305, 308 (Cal. 1994)).
78. Jeremy Hsu, 75 Percent of U.S. Drivers Fear Self-Driving Cars, But It’s an Easy
Fear to Get Over, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 7, 2016, 15:01 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/
cars-that-think/transportation/self-driving/driverless-cars-inspire-both-fear-and-hope.
79. See, e.g., MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, MADD STATEMENT ON
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY LEGISLATION, (October 4, 2017), https://www.ma
dd.org/press-release/madd-statement-autonomous-vehicle-technology-legislation/.
80. NHTSA, supra note 6, at ii.
81. GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2 at 3 (emphasis added).
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consumers with the impression that these vehicles truly can do no wrong.
Consider the following language from Delivering Safety: Nuro’s Approach:
Our vehicle is engineered to be safer than nearly any other – it
is lighter than a passenger vehicle, narrower and more nimble, and
operates at lower speeds. This approach gives us more time to react,
shortens our stopping distance, and provides an additional safety
buffer to the side of the vehicle. Together, these advantages help
prevent accidents that standard vehicles cannot avoid, such as
someone jumping out from between parked cars or swerving across
the road. 82
It is certainly true that HAV technology will revolutionize automotive safety
overall. However, these types of statements may lead many consumers to
believe that autonomous vehicles should perform to the point of infallibility,
which is simply not possible, especially at this early stage of development.
For example, on May 7, 2016, a driver of a Tesla Model S was killed when
the driver collided with a tractor-trailer who was crossing an uncontrolled
intersection. 83 The vehicle’s data resulted in three important findings:
(1) That the Tesla was being driven in autopilot mode at the time
of the accident;
(2) the automatic emergency braking (AEB) system did not
automatically brake or warn to avoid the collision, and;
(3) that the driver did not take any preventive steps, i.e. braking or
steering, to avoid the collision. 84
Because of the accident, both the National Transportation Safety Board
(“NTSB”) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) through their Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) conducted
investigations. 85
For example, the ODI investigated: (1) the AEB system design and
performance; (2) human-machine interfaces related to operating in autopilot
mode; (3) additional accident data regarding Tesla’s autopilot and AEB
82. Nuro, Delivering Safety: Nuro’s Approach 8 (2019), https://tonnietal
ler.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/d5d69-delivering_safety_nuros_approach.pdf.
83. NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, available at https://static.n
htsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.pdf.
84. NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 83, at 1.
85. See NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 83; see also
NTSB, NTSB/HAR-17/02, COLLISION BETWEEN A CAR WITH AUTOMATED VEHICLE
CONTROL SYSTEMS AND A TRACTOR-SEMITRAILER TRUCK (2017), available at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1702.pdf.
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systems; and, (4) the changes if any Tesla has made to such autopilot and
AEB systems. 86 The result of the investigation was that there were no defects
in the design or performance of the autopilot or AEB systems in the vehicles
studied – nor was there a situation to which the systems did not perform as
designed. 87
Given the situation, is it reasonable to task an “ordinary consumer” with
properly determining whether the AEB and autopilot systems are in fact
functioning properly or improperly? Compare the reported results of the
investigations by NHTSA’s ODI and the NTSB with the statements by
Forbes contributor, Brad Templeton, in his article, “Tesla Autopilot Repeats
Fatal Crash; Do They Learn From Past Mistakes?”88 To wit, Templeton
posits, “Even so, most would hope the Tesla Autopilot would have detected
the truck crossing in front of it, which appeared not to happen. No braking
or evasive actions were taken. The Autopilot was engaged just 10 seconds
before the collision.” 89 He further opines:
As such, having already had a fatality from (the old system’s)
failure to identify the broad side of a transport trailer, that would
have to be very high on the list of the sort of thing they would want
their fleet to find and identify for them, so they can confirm it never
fails to perceive a crossing truck. Somehow, it still failed. Of all
the things you would expect Tesla to identify, these few things
which resulted in fatal accidents, like a truck side and a
highway crash attenuator, should be at the very top of the list. 90
Although Templeton is likely more informed than the ordinary consumer,
the opinions expressed in his article and the conclusions reached by the
NHTSA and NTSB are in clear contradiction of one another. Thus, when
considering the expectations of the everyday consumer, it is clear the
necessary information is simply not available to conduct investigations such
as the one carried out by the ODI or the NTSB, which can take months of
analysis and result in sixty-three-page accident reports, and ultimately
determine what actually occurred.
Similar to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Trejo that the
consumer expectations test could lead to virtually unlimited liability in cases
of complex products, the current climate of high expectations regarding
86. See NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 83, at 1.
87. See id. at 12.
88. Brad Templeton, Tesla Autopilot Repeats Fatal Crash; Do They Learn From

Past Mistakes?, FORBES (2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradtempleton/2019/05/2
1/tesla-autopilot-repeats-fatal-crash-do-they-learn-from-past-mistakes/#400f773f2f2e.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
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HAVs would likely mean that a HAV manufacturer would lose every time
when the consumer applications test is applied. Consumers will expect that
HAVs should avoid accidents one hundred percent of the time, so any time
one of these vehicles is involved in an accident, it has already failed the
consumer expectations test. This type of res ipsa loquitur conclusion
undermines the concept of design defects in products liability law and would
allow plaintiffs to completely sidestep the requirement of a showing that an
HAV was in fact defective, effectively making manufacturers of HAVs
insurers of those products’ safety. 91 In essence, plaintiffs would no longer
bear the burden of making a showing of product defect.
Further, much of an individual consumer’s expectations about the way a
vehicle should perform in an accident scenario are shaped by the behavior of
other drivers. 92 Without the traditional feedback from other drivers to which
consumers are accustomed, these expectations are wholly lacking to describe
how autonomous vehicle technology will perform in an accident situation. 93
As noted in a report issued by the University of Michigan’s Transportation
Research Institute, “[t]he degree of importance of both driver expectations
and feedback from other drivers, and the consequent effects on the safety of
a traffic system containing both conventional and self-driving vehicles,
remain to be ascertained.” 94
V.
POLICY REASONS FOR NOT APPLYING THE CONSUMER
EXPECTATIONS TEST TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY.
As noted, autonomous vehicle technology has the potential to decrease
traffic injuries and deaths.95 By applying the consumer expectations test, in
which unknowledgeable consumers are not required to take into account the
utility of a product, or the possibility of a feasible alternative design, courts
could expose manufacturers to significant uncertainty in product liability
litigation. If the standard by which a product will be judged is on the
unpredictable expectations of consumers in such a complex and changing
technology, rather than by demonstration of the product’s utility, the
threshold for deployment by a manufacturer may change:

91. See Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co., 736 S.E.2d 309, 314–15 (Va. 2013) (noting
that in failure to warn cases, as well as in products liability cases, removal of the defect
requirement could allow plaintiffs to attribute any generalized danger to a manufacturer
without any showing of defect in that product).
92. See MICHAEL SIVAK & BRANDON SCHOETTLE, ROAD SAFETY WITH SELFDRIVING VEHICLES: GENERAL LIMITATIONS AND ROAD SHARING WITH CONVENTIONAL
VEHICLES 5 (Univ. of Mich. Trans. Res. Inst. Report No. 2015-2, 2015).
93. See id.
94. See id. (emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 79.
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Thus, even though an autonomous vehicle may be safer overall than
a conventional vehicle, it will shift the responsibility for accidents,
and hence liability, from drivers to manufacturers. The shift will
push the manufacturer away from the socially optimal outcome—
to develop the autonomous vehicle. 96
To the contrary, under a risk-utility analysis, particularly one that requires
proof of a safer, practicable alternative design, automotive manufacturers
will be able to show that the societal benefits from the use of HAV
technology as opposed to other technologies outweigh the risk of individual
malfunctions in individual cases. 97
Consider the following example that illustrates the possible effect of
unbridled consumer expectations on the introduction of beneficial new
technology:
Suppose . . . that a particular type of “autobrake” crash-avoidance
technology works to prevent crashes 80 percent of the time. The
other 20 percent of the time, however, the technology does not work
and the crash occurs as it would have in the absence of the
technology. Victims in those crashes may sue the manufacturer and
argue that the product was defective because it failed to operate
properly in their crashes. Under existing liability doctrine, they
have a plausible argument: The product did not work as
designed . . . . A manufacturer facing the decision whether to
employ such a technology in its vehicles might very well decide not
to, purely on the basis of expected liability costs. 98
Without any balancing of the utility of these vehicles or the requirement of
a reasonable alternative design, it would be possible, even reasonable, for
juries applying the consumer expectations test to find defective design every
time. This will be especially true in situations such as those involving selfdriving vehicle technology, since consumers tend to have unrealistic
expectations about the benefits of this new technology as a whole. 99
Further, the consumer expectations test will not allow for consideration of
non-safety related societal benefits that HAV technology provides, since the
only consideration will be on whether the product performed as expected in
96. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1334
(2012).
97. See id.
98. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 125 (2016).
99. See id. at 125.
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that one instance. The average American commuter spends about one week
of his or her life in traffic each year—a statistic that HAV manufacturers
have set their sights on reducing. 100 The potential time saved by commuters
on the whole is not a factor that would be considered under the consumer
expectations test.
Another benefit of HAV technology outside of the realm of safety is the
potential for added mobility for those who cannot currently drive. 101
According to a report from NHTSA, 3 million Americans are blind or suffer
from poor vision. 102 Further, 79 percent of Americans over the age of 65 live
in car-dependent communities. 103 The independence these communities
could gain with the widespread use of HAV technology would be yet another
consideration the jury could not take into account when utilizing the
consumer expectations test.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts should reject the consumer expectations test as grounds for
determining design defect in cases involving autonomous vehicle
technology. This technology is simply too complex and unfamiliar for
consumer expectations to have developed enough to have any real meaning
or reasonable application. Utilization of risk-utility balancing is a more
appropriate means of establishing whether or not a design is defective and
will encourage manufacturers to continue to develop and implement this
important technology, which stands to have a truly revolutionary impact on
automotive safety.

100. See GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2, at 3; see also DAVID SCHRANK, BILL
EISELE, ET AL., THE TEXAS A&M TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE & INRIX, 2015 URBAN
MOBILITY SCORECARD 1–2 (2015), https://static.tti.tamu.edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/mo
bility-scorecard-2015.pdf (noting that, as of 2014, the American commuter spends an
average of approximately 42 hours per years in traffic).
101. See generally WAYMO, supra note 2, at 6.
102. NHTSA, DOT HS 811 304, QUIETER CARS AND THE SAFETY OF BLIND
PEDESTRIANS: PHASE I 6 (2010), https://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20
Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/2010/811304rev.pdf.
103. See SANDRA ROSENBLOOM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE MOBILITY NEEDS
OF OLDER AMERICANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION REAUTHORIZATION 3
(2003), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20030807_Rosenbloo
m.pdf.

